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Liability And Immunity 
In International Business Law*
Introduction
International business law has always been a diverse area of the law merging various 
legal sources and doctrines, operating in a business environment that is in constant 
motion. While the sources of international business law may seem to be scattered 
and fragmented lacking a uniied core of law, this uncertainty could rightly serve the 
needs of business players in the international market providing them the probably 
most important doctrine this sector desires: freedom of contract. In this respect, 
freedom of contract in international business law always focused on the freedom 
to establish the content of the agreement, therefore, the lack of imperative rules 
provided a great deal of freedom to businesses allowing them to become almost 
totally independent from the shackles of national laws.1  
1  Lorenzo, Sixto Sanchez: Choice of Law and Overriding Mandatory Rules in International 
Contracts Ater Rome I, Yearbook of Private International Law, 12 (2010) 68.
*   A tanulmány az Igazságügyi Minisztérium jogászképzés színvonalának emelését célzó programjai 
keretében valósult meg. (he study was implemented under the programs of the Ministry of Justice 
of Hungary for raising the standard of legal education.)
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While national laws still facilitate businesses operating internationally with 
predictable and well established rules, the contracting parties may set up a unique 
system for their special relationships leaving almost no grounds and gaps to ill for 
the rules of national law. he various dispute settlement options – especially out of 
court dispute settlement schemes – may also grant the possibility to settle a dispute 
without the involvement of professional judges and the application of virtually 
anything other than their agreement. Uniication, therefore, is undeniably di cult 
in any areas of contract law when codiication targets international transactions. 
It may not seem to be a reality any time soon, however, businesses tend to be very 
diferent in size and needs, and many – mostly the small and medium size enterprises 
– still wish to get helping hands and model agreements to lower their legal costs and 
administrative burdens. UNCITRAL may facilitate them with model agreements2 
designed to serve as beacons for typical business transactions in the international 
market, boilerplate clauses mainly arise from national laws, and are so attached to 
the domestic concept of contract law thereof. 
Choice of law clauses in the agreements are oten directed by how a legal system 
regulates the most important questions of breach and the available civil remedies 
for the non-breaching party. Some systems are more attractive to international 
businesses than others, so it seems to be a natural desire in some legal systems to still 
vindicate universal application to core rules in their contract laws even if the parties 
wish to step out from the domestic arena. Another interesting phenomenon is how 
the enforcement of damages awards of injunctions gets extremely problematic with 
the involvement of state bodies, public agencies, and even of state owned companies. 
To escape the jurisdiction of a foreign forum or a foreign legal system, states and 
their related organs may be willing to go very far to defend their interests and 
channel the dispute and its resolution into the law enforcement – mostly litigation 
– system they established and operate. his phenomenon simpliies the question 
for businesses trading internationally to one problem: what would be the optimal 
scheme to regulate liability and immunity in international business law. 
he research analyzed national contract laws and some internationally agreed 
standards to ind the most desirable regimes for setting up a balanced and somewhat 
independent system of liability and immunity, and this study aims to share the most 
important indings of the research. At the end of the day, dimensions of liability and 
the evergreen debate of state immunity get to the same problem: how to provide a 
2  An example to model agreements is the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL): Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the 
Construction of Industrial Works, New York, United Nations (1988).
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scheme in national laws that attract businesses and lure them in the territory of a 
given country. While the obvious answer would be that lexible and under-regulated 
systems may win the prize in the race, the race to the bottom concept has long been 
surpassed by the needs for certainty and predictability in the 21st century. 
1. Models for assessing liability for breach of a contract
Contracts are natural engines of trading internationally and provide the backbone 
to relationships between businesses that wish to step out of their domestic safety. 
Still, the lack of a universal set of rules for breach and the available remedies is a 
long-accepted anomaly of international business law, and even regional uniications 
tend to remain inefective in this regard.3  Sectoral regimes of liability, however, exist 
for certain types of contracts even in a universal level. he most obvious example is 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (hereinater: 
CISG) that 85 state parties ratiied, and they are form various parts of the globe. 
Sales contracts are certainly vital and classic transactions in the international market, 
however, they seem to be the only transactions enjoying some uniication in terms 
of basic doctrines and rules for breach, liability and remedies. 
Other types of agreements (most importantly distribution, franchising and 
licensing) oten cry for some uniication and ind resolution and subsidiary rules 
in national legal systems forcing the contracting parties to choose an applicable law 
of the many domestic systems available to govern their transaction. hat is why the 
dominancy of national laws is so obvious in this regard, and the questions of liability 
are still determined by national contract laws. It makes parties ind a system that 
they can mutually agree on, and one that provides an almost gapless regime for the 
most classic cases of breach and that deines the available remedies. Parties to an 
international business transaction rarely rely on the rules of private international 
law – conlict of laws – to ind the governing law for their transaction, as it oten 
is unpredictable and exposes them to laws they would otherwise never agree to 
apply.4 And, we should not forget about the concept of ‘auxiliary law’ in private 
international law that allows the forum – most commonly the court – to apply the 
laws of the forum in an actual debate in case they ind anomalies in the governing 
law the parties mutually agreed on earlier. 
3  De Ly, Filip: Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-
Regulation. In: Appelbaum, Richard–Felstiner, William–Gessner, Volkmar: Rules and 
Networks – he Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions, Oxford, Hart Publishing 
(2001) 163.
4  Torga, Maarja: Party Autonomy in Private International Law as a Tool for Converging 
National Laws, Vilnius, Vilnius University Publishing (2010) 356.
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While the CISG applies exclusively to sales transactions, it seems that recent reforms 
in national contract laws made the breach and remedy chapter of the Convention 
so popular among businesses that the way the CISG regulates damages and force 
majeure are oten implemented in the agreement of the parties in the international 
arena.5 he CISG established strict liability for covering the loss the non-breaching 
might have sufered as consequence of the breach. Strict liability seems to be a 
fair ground for the allocation of risks as businesses rarely feel the breaching party 
exempted from liability in cases fault could not be proved on their sides. Strict 
liability technically admits the acknowledgement of risks at the time the parties 
conclude the contract, as it allows both parties to the agreement to calculate a fair 
consideration based on the risks they take. As risks are very diverse and may depend 
on the nature of the business a party conducts, the political stability in the country of 
business, the climate, the infrastructure, the rules of labor law, public administration, 
environmental protection regulations, and the involvement of public agencies 
to oversee the operation of businesses, only the contracting party itself is able to 
name the price of these risks when it gets engaged in an enforceable agreement.6 
herefore, the only defense could be force majeure, an impediment that is beyond 
the party’s control, and was unforeseeable at the time the contract was made, and 
the breaching party could not overcome this impediment. he three-prong defense 
test suggests that exoneration of liability for breach is extremely di cult under 
the scope of the CISG. Courts and arbitration bodies dressed up the concept of 
force majeure with thick armor, granting exoneration to the breaching party only 
under extreme circumstances (e.g. embargos, revolutions, coups, wars, unexpected 
political decisions, export restrictions, natural disasters and workers strikes).7 While 
these decisions interpreted the CISG and sales contracts, we conclude that parties 
volunteer to include the same regime in other types of business transactions as well. 
heir motivations seem obvious: the CISG claims international application 
preempting national contract laws completely, therefore, the application of the rules 
of the Convention always happened in consideration of the needs of international 
business. hese specialties of the CISG’s liability regime attract business to copy 
the text of the Convention into their agreement even if the contract is not a sales 
5  Sonja A. Kruisinga: he Impact of Uniform Law on National Laws: Limits and Possibilities, 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 13 (2009) 2, 20.
6  Zaheeruddin, Mohammed: Claim for Damages and their Requirements under the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, International Journal of 
Liberal Arts and Social Science, 4 (2016) 1, 49
7  Zareshahi, Ali: A Comparative Study of Damages and Price Reduction Remedy for Breach 
of Sale Contract under CISG, Journal of Politics and Law, 4 (2016) 10, 131.
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contract. Also, the rules on calculating damages in the CISG provide fair and 
predictable alternatives to the extremely chaotic solutions experienced in national 
contract laws. While the rules in national laws range from restricted compensation 
to full compensation, providing schemes for calculation or leaving the counting part 
to the forum, the CISG practically urges the non-breaching party to mitigate its loss 
through a reasonable and good-faith substitute transaction. 
he diference in price between the breached contract and the substitute 
transaction will be the amount of damages. While parties to non-sales transactions 
cannot directly point to the application of the CISG, and they cannot rely on the 
Convention as a set of subsidiary rules for their transactions, the actual agreement 
may derogate the liability rules and the schemes on the calculation of damages in 
national contract laws in most countries. he undeniable advantage of the CISG’s 
solution is that it enjoys irm interpretation and case-law developed due to the high 
number of cases and court and arbitration decisions available to the public, even in 
the national language in most cases.8 
Another very popular solution to resolve the questions of liability for breach is the 
USA’s Uniform Commercial Code’s (hereinater: UCC) model. he UCC imposes 
objective liability for the unlikely event of breach, and states that breach is a situation 
in which any reasonable business would consider performance impossible.9 his 
objective approach to the deinition of breach refers to the common law concept 
on interpreting contracts, in general. As opposed to civil law legal systems, common 
law systems do not put an emphasis on the speaker’s intent, instead, they scrutinize 
interpretation based on a reasonable bystander as of the same kind.10  
Common law legal systems tend to be very strict in terms of remedies available 
for breach, and they rarely allow courts to cure the breach by imposing special 
performance obligations to the breaching party.11 he more classic remedy is to 
award damages to the non-breaching party. he common law mind believes in 
freedom of contract to the extreme, therefore, contract theories in the UCC also 
promote the parties intent instead of providing an option to the courts to intervene 
8  A good example is UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, UNCITRAL (2012).
9  Eisenberg, Miller: Damages versus Speciic Performance: Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 
New York University Law and Economics Working Papers (2013) 334.
10  Rowley, Keith A.: Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the „Four Corners” to Parol 
Evidence (and Everything in Between), UNLV Scholarly Works (1999) 554.
11 Zareshahi: op. cit. 135.
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in the autonomous relationship of the parties. Damages are only allowed, according 
to the UCC, if there was a breach and the non-breaching party does not claim 
performance. Defenses against the damages claim are very interestingly regulated 
by the UCC. he breaching party may not be held liable for recovering the loss 
its actions caused to the other contracting party if the impediment leading to the 
breach was unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and the risk 
that served as an impediment was not allocated to either party.12 Compared to the 
CISG solution, it is a diferent limitation on the concept of force majeure as the 
UCC relies more on the parties’ original intents manifested in the contract, instead 
of some independent evaluation of the impediment. Risk allocation is, therefore, 
heavily promoted in the UCC urging parties to share the risks they face in the course 
of performance, and allocate them to either one of them taking full responsibility 
for these risks. Risk allocation is, in fact, a very friendly way of settling damages and 
liability in business relations. As in case of risk allocation, we may not even talk 
about liability in case the risk becomes real, as, originally in the contract, one of the 
parties agreed to take responsibility for the risk. Instead of liability for breach, it is 
more like an obligation the party volunteered to take. 
It is hard not to deduct a conclusion from the UCC’s proposed model for ‘liability’. 
he UCC inds it more important to let the parties decide how to handle liability 
for breach and it lets them continue their business relations with a better impression, 
not feeling they even had a dispute. In fact, it is similar to the Japanese ‘wa’ concept 
that relects to the Japanese contracting style by placing an emphasis on developing 
a trusting long term relationship. In Japan, there is an aversion to litigation, 
therefore, the law and contract law philosophy put an emphasis on contracting 
parties working out their diferences among themselves instead of turning to a 
dispute settlement body. Decisions, in such cases, are almost always based on ‘ring-
sho’ consensus.13 his is exactly why the UCC seems to be very popular among 
businesses trading internationally, and drive non-U.S. business to the conclusion 
that a pre-set allocation of risks in the contract may lead to faster, cheaper and less 
painful settlement of any arguments they may develop in the contract performance 
stage. 
Defenses to a breach can only be impediments that are not typical for the regular 
course of the parties’ businesses, and, since they were not foreseeable at contracting, 
parties did not allocate them to either of them. In such cases, the court’ or the dispute 
12 Article 2-715 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1990).
13  Wagatsuma, Hiroshi–Rosett, Arthur: Cultural Attitudes Towards Contract Law: Japan and 
the United States Compared, Paciic Basin Law Journal, 2 (1983) 1-2, 78.
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resolution forum’s interpretation is somewhat limited. hey can only evaluate 
whether the impediment was foreseeable or not, whether it belonged to the regular 
course of the breaching party’s business or not. his evaluation is much simpler than 
the three-prong test that adds two other factors (out of control, overcoming the 
impediment) to the equation. he UCC, on the other hand, takes mitigation very 
serious, and allows a proportionate deduction from the amount of damages in case 
the non-breaching party fails to mitigate the loss. Substitute transactions, however, 
are just one forms of mitigation but not particularly promoted by the UCC. 
2. Limitations on the scope of damages
Once the core questions of breach and liability are decided, calculating damages 
gets to the center of the procedure. Full compensation rarely serves the goals of 
businesses operating and trading internationally, therefore, contracting parties 
oten deine special categories of damages limiting their liabilities for certain types 
instead of all. Civil law legal systems typically take a position on the composition of 
damages following a three-tier approach: direct damages (damnum emergens), loss 
of earnings (lucrum cessans), and expenses necessary to mitigate the loss. Civil law 
legal systems do not diferentiate among the base of damages, they distinguish on 
their composition in nature. 
Common law legal systems, on the other hand, usually list multiple types of 
damages disregarding the inner composition of them.14  Expectation damages cover 
the beneit of the bargain imposing an obligation to the breaching party to put the 
other party in a situation as if the contract had been properly performed. In practice, 
expectation damages are very classic forms of the reimbursement obligation parties 
include in the contract.15 Reliance damages aim to reimburse the costs of the non-
breaching party’s eforts he invested in the future performance of his end of the 
bargain given that the other party also performs his obligations.16  Reliance damages 
may be excessive in certain cases, therefore, it is a common trend in international 
business contracting that parties either exclude the reimbursement of reliance 
damages completely in their relations, or they impose caps on the amount of reliance 
damages. 
14  Pearce, David–Halson, Roger: Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution, 
and Vindication, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 28 (2008) 1, 85
15  Brooks, Richard R.W.–Stremitzer, Alexander: Remedies On and Of Contract, he Yale Law 
Journal, 120 (2011) 4, 720.
16 Brooks, Stremnitzer: op. cit. 725.
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Consequential damages provoke the most debates in courts and arbitration 
committees, as they aim to recover indirect loss that occurred in ‘reasonable’ 
connection to the breach.17 Consequential damages are typically limited by the 
law in many legal systems, however, the doctrines of causes a system applies for 
the restriction heavily vary. hey range from the but-for test through proximity 
to foreseeability. As the general concept on business transactions in international 
business law relies on full disclosure, the law typically promotes parties to disclose 
all potential motivations they have under the contract: practically, the law urges 
them to share what losses they face in case the other party breaches various duties 
undertaken in the contract. his approach is similar to the UCC’s risk allocation 
solution for inding who is ‘liable’ for the breach, however, a certain trust is expected 
from the parties when it comes to full disclosure. Disclosure, however, triggers 
conidentiality questions and the fear of exposing trade secrets to a rival or to the 
general public, while it may be the only resort to prove that consequential loss 
was well known to the breaching party, therefore, he cannot escape the liability to 
reimburse them. 
An existing practical di culty in the world of international business contracts is 
the very diferent approach common law and civil law legal systems take in the 
debate over contract penalties. While civil law legal systems promote the agreement 
on penalties to secure certain duties of the parties, common law legal system ind 
penalties violating public order, and order them unenforceable for the courts. 
Instead, common law legal systems require a reasonable estimation of potential 
losses the non-breaching party may sufer if the other party breaches a duty 
(liquidated or stipulated damages).18 here is a very thin line between the civil law 
concept on penalties and the common law approach to liquidated damages. When 
the applicable law is of a common law system’s or the forum resides in a common 
law country, it is vital to have a clause in the contract that leaves no ambiguity that 
it was never meant to serve as contract penalty. 
he only way contracting parties may avoid inding the clause unenforceable in the 
common law world is if they agree on dual-use clauses in the contract. Even if they 
intend to state penalties to secure some duties, they better of providing grounds of 
calculation and some explanation on why they got to the conclusion that the sum 
may cover the reasonable loss of the non-breaching party. If it is clear that the sum 
17 Brooks, Stremnitzer: op. cit. 719.
18  Benjamin, Peter: Penalties, Liquidated Damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial 
Contracts: A Comparative Study of English and Continental Law, he International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 9 (1960) 4, 613.
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was based on a reasonable estimation and the nature and type of the loss are logical 
and are likely that the non-breaching party may sufer them, common law courts 
are willing to enforce these pre-set awards. In the civil law legal systems, the rules of 
calculation and the motivation that parties wanted to provide an estimation to the 
penalty are irrelevant, and do not undermine enforceability. 
3.  Reactions of national laws to the needs  
of international players in terms of liability 
National laws typically feel the need of businesses operating and trading 
internationally and they try to provide solutions not to chase these businesses away 
from applying their national laws. We may identify diverse solutions and reactions 
on how legislators or judicial practice respond to these challenges:
-  Promoting ‘big business’ in general: an interesting approach is when 
the legislator establishes national contract law on the presumption that 
contract law is mainly used by big players, big businesses. In such systems 
(e.g. Hungary), national contract law targets to serve the needs of big 
volume transactions pushing contract law closer to the international 
arena’s desires.19
-  Various dimensions of contracting: a classic solution is when the rules of 
national contract law are systematically grouped for various transactions. 
In these systems (e.g. Germany) rules are diferent to B2B (business to 
business), B2C (business to consumer) and C2C (consumer to consumer) 
relations having stricter criteria for defenses in the B2B range.20 
-  Protective norms in favor of the national law: it is a rare solution when 
the legislator composes imperative norms in national contract law, and 
obliges courts to honor these norms even if the parties agreed in the 
application of a foreign legal system (e.g. China). 21
-  Separate regimes for domestic and international transactions: some 
countries are willing to give up their concepts on contracts in cases of 
international transactions. hey apply diferent set of rules for domestic 
19 Article 6:142 of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (Hungary).
20  Schwenzer, Ingeborg–Whitebread, Claudio Marti: International B2B Contracts – Freedom 
Unchained?, Penn State Journal of Law & International Afairs, 4 (2015) 1, 45.
21  Jianhua, Zhong–Guanghua, Yu: China’s Uniform Contract Law: Progress and Problems, 
Paciic Basin Journal, 17 (2009) 1, 27.
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and international contracts. he USA is a great example to that 
approach. While the U.S. has never let its contract law to be manipulated 
by the international obligations of the country, it is very lenient in 
joining and ratifying international treaties and conventions that apply 
to international business transactions, even if these international 
instruments are typically closer to civil law contract doctrines and 
principles.22 
As diferent systems react to the rapidly changing international market 
with diverse instruments, choice of law and forum selection clauses in 
the actual contracts are even more important than they were a couple 
decades ago. Even if the parties agree on the applicable law, the forum 
may overwrite the choice of law clause due to some imperative norms, 
or they may ind themselves in a legal environment that classiies their 
transactions diferently from their intentions.
Another interesting angle of the diversity of national laws related 
to contractual obligations is the way states and the international 
community interpret the nature and the scope of the immunity 
doctrines in international business relations. he classic rule of ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’ might easily be derogated by the immunity concepts in 
cases when state bodies or state-like entities are engaged in business 
relations.
4.  The immunity principles as obstacles  
in international business law
Commercial activities of states are oten protected by the principle of immunity. 
As the doctrine developed over the years in the form of undisputed international 
usances,23 states enjoy sovereignty and immunity for their activities either. A 
governmental (acta jure imperii) or commercial (acta jure gestionis).24  
22  Aguiar, Anelize Slomp: he Law Applicable to International Trade Transactions with Brazilian 
Parties: A Comparative Study of the Brazilian Law, the CISG, and the American Law about 
Contract Formation, Toronto, University of Toronto Press (2011) 59.
23  Byers, Michael: Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1999) 4.; Shaw, Malcolm N.: 
International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2008) 141.
24  Yee, Sienho: Foreign Sovereign Immunitites, Acta Jure Imperii and Acta Jure Gestionis: A 
Recent Exposition from the Canadian Supreme Court, Chinese Journal of International Law, 
2 (2003) 2, 649.
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We have to, however, distinguish the two basic forms of immunity: enforcement 
and jurisdictional immunity. Immunity from jurisdiction refers to a limitation of 
the adjudicatory power of national courts,25 whereas immunity from enforcement 
prevents courts of the forum state from imposing measures of constraint on the 
foreign State.26 
Traces of origin in early history shows that the immunity doctrine was an 
absolute concept, though it was granted to merchants who enjoyed the status of 
state dependents.27 his absolutism went through the development of customary 
international law28 and impulsed state conidence in international market, 
commonly by using immunity as a safe harbor for their misconduct. he absolute 
character of immunity, however, tended to fundamentally be unfair for private 
entities when they got engaged in commercial relations with state enterprises. he 
shield of immunity was commonly used to avoid private accountability for the state’s 
commercial activities. Western Europe and the United States then constructed a 
slight restriction of the immunity doctrine,29 especially in dealing with disagreement 
of immunity for the commercial nature of state activities.
he restrictive approach of the immunity doctrine provided that states could merely 
be immune from the jurisdiction related to their “public acts” (acta jure imperii) but 
were not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign forums for their “private acts” 
(acta jure gestionis).30 his concept was then adopted by several national laws, i.e. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (the United States),31 he State Immunity Act 
25  Lauterpacht, Hersch: he Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, British 
Yearbook of International Law, 28 (1951), 220-225.
26  Wiesinger, Eva: State Immunity from Enforcement Measures, University of Vienna 
(2006) 1. [Available at: http://intlaw.univie.ac.at/ileadmin/user_upload/int_beziehungen/
Internetpubl/wiesinger.pdf (Accessed: April 2nd, 2017)].
27  Rollinger, Robert–Ulf, Christoph (eds.): Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient 
World Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction, Proceedings of the Fith Annual 
Symposium of the Assyrian and Babylonian Intellectual Heritage Project, Innsbruck (2002) 
97.
28  Brownlie, Ian: Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2008) 
323-327.
29  McNamara, Tom: A Primer on Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Paper presented in Union 
Internationale des Avocats, Winter Seminar on International Civil Litigation and the 
United States of America (2006) 1. [Available at: http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/
McNamara1.pdf (Accessed: April 2nd, 2017)].
30  Dorsey, William R.: Relections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ater Twenty 
Years, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 28 (1997) 2, 262-265.
31 Dorsey: op. cit.
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(the United Kingdom),32 and was also used as a source of interpretation by judges, 
i.e. in the case of Stukonis v. USA Embassy,33 Philippine Embassy Bank Account,34 
Leica AG v. Central Bank of Iraq et Etat Irakien,35 and other cases in which the 
courts improved the appropriate test to determine the acts of the state whether these 
have a public or private character. Furthermore, international communities agreed 
upon initiatives to universalize such restrictions of the immunity doctrine through 
multilateral treaties such as the European Convention on State Immunity (1976)36 
and the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
heir Territories (2004).37
he concept of restrictive immunity could not gain full universal acceptance 
because, obviously, some countries are still interpreting immunity as an absolute 
concept. In the recent case of FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the High Court of Hong Kong by formal support from the Minister 
of Foreign Afairs of Hong Kong ‘in position that a state and its property shall, 
in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including absolute immunity from 
jurisdiction and from execution, and has never applied the so-called principle 
or theory of ‘restrictive immunity’.38 Moreover, private actors must work hard to 
prepare argumentation in determining the acts of state whether the debated act 
is of a public or private nature. his oten burdens the court’s infrastructure and 
energy. Even if the Court rules for the private actors, they are forced to struggle with 
the enforcement court which sometimes operates under a diferent legal system, 
and, therefore, applies diferent interpretations and practices. hey still have to go 
through the enforcement process, unless there is a consent of their partner state to 
waive the immunity under the scope of the private agreement.
32  Bowett, D. W.: he State Immunity Act 1978, he Cambridge Law Journal, 37 (1978) 2, 193.
33  Toleikyté, Meringa: he Concept of State Immunity and he Main Challenges (2015) 
[Available at: http://www.tf.vu.lt/dokumentai/Admin/Doktorant%C5%B3_konferencija/
Toleikyte.pdf (Accessed: March 3rd, 2017)].
34  Philippine Embassy Case, Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, 13 December 1977, 46 
BVerfG, 342; 65 ILR 146.164.
35 Leica AG v. Central Bank of Iraq et Etat Irakien, Cour d’appel, Brussels, 15 February 2000
36 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 1495 U.N.T.S. 181.
37  United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and heir Property, 
G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinater ‘UN Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities’]
38  FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment of the 
High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region No. 928 of 2008. par.14. 
[Available at: http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_
body.jsp?ID=&DIS=63653&QS=%28irm%29&TP=JU (Accessed: March 3rd, 2017)].
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In the 21st century, international businesses and several working groups encourage 
states to restrict the immunity doctrine within the scope of their national laws 
and practices. he main argument these entities bring up to justify the urge for 
limitation of a wide interpretation of the immunity doctrine is basically the 
dynamics of modern economic development. Under such circumstances, it is an 
obvious need from the investors to get legal certainty, predictability to protect their 
investments in a foreign country. When a state could maintain justice within the 
business environment, this would increase the state’s image make it look like a pro-
investment state, and may also boost the economic development for the nation’s 
welfare.
he European Convention on State Immunity was the irst comprehensive 
international multilateral treaty that addressed the problem of state immunity. It 
was adopted on 16 May 1972 by the Council of Europe and came into force on 
11 June 1976. he Convention was clearly an attempt in international legislation 
on one of these perennial problems among a group of European states to establish 
restrictive measures on immunity. It is currently ratiied by eight countries in the 
European Union such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.39 Five of these countries (Austria Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland) are also parties to the Convention’s 
Additional protocol that established the European Tribunal in matters of State 
Immunity.40 his Tribunal determines disputes under the Convention.41 
In December 2004, the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and their Properties (UN Convention) was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly.42 Capping more than a quarter of a century of intense 
international negotiation, the new treaty is the irst modern multilateral instrument 
to articulate a comprehensive approach to issues of state or sovereign immunity 
from suits in foreign courts.43 he main purpose of this Convention is to provide 
a single rule and common measures on the application and interpretation of state 
39  Council of Europe: Chart of Signatures and Ratiications of Treaty European Convention 
on State Immunity, (2016), [Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/
conventions/treaty/074/signatures (Accessed: November 20th, 2015)]
40  he Additional Protocol to the European Convention on State Immunity, came into force on 
22 May 1985.
41  Edwards, Richard W.: Extraterritorial Application of the US Iranian Assets Control 
Regulations, he American Journal of International Law, 78 (1981) 4, 870.
42 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities.
43  Stewart, David P.: he UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and heir 
Property, he American Journal of International Law, 99 (2005) 1, 194.
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immunity. It also harmonizes the restrictive approach of state immunity into 
the domestic laws of the Contracting States. Indeed, the Convention builds 
on the experiences gathered under the 1972 European Convention on State 
Immunity as well as on state practices under various domestic statutory regimes.44 
Unfortunately, this Convention has not yet come into force because of its failure 
to be ratiied by the minimum number of states.45 Until now, there are only 12 
state parties to this Convention, including: Austria, France, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Saudi 
Arabia.46 
In international law, the doctrine of immunity is a derivation from the principle of 
par in parem non habet imperium (one sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over another sovereign power). As sovereign entities, states enjoy immunity, a 
legal protection for their representatives, assets, and activities. However, this 
study supports Lauterpacht’s view: the doctrine of immunity is basically not part 
of customary international law, considering the inconsistencies of its application 
and related practice.47 Prior to the mid-twentieth century, state immunity was seen 
in nearly absolute terms.48 In the era of globalization, states became more engaged 
in commercial activities, and private entities interacting with foreign states lashed 
out absolute sovereign immunity as a fundamentally unfair practice that eliminates 
judicial recourse and one that favors state parties. 
44  Dickinson, Andrew–Lindsay, Rae–Loonam, James P.–Chance, Cliford: State Immunity: 
Selected Materials and Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2004).
45  UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, Article 30 paragraph (1) and (2) states: (1) 
he present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratiication, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary- General of the United Nations. (2) For each State ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to the present Convention ater the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of 
ratiication, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 
thirtieth day ater the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratiication, acceptance, 
approval or accession.
46  Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI). (2011) State of 
Signatures and Ratiications of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and heir Property and the European Convention on State Immunity. [Available at: http://
www.coe.int/en/web/cahdi/meeting-documents?p_p_id=101&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_
state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&_101_struts_action=%2Fasset_publisher%2Fview_
content&_101_type=content&_101_assetEntryId=2066048) (Accessed: November 28th, 
2015)].
47 Lauterpacht: op. cit. 227-228.
48  Henderson, Conway W.: Understanding International Law, Oxford, John Wiley & Sons 
(2010) 140
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During the historical development, the approach on state immunity changed to a 
restrictive immunity concept. his approach is based on the two diferent acts of the 
state. According to the restrictive immunity doctrine, private acts of the state (acta 
jure gestionis) are no longer immune. Only public acts of the state (acta jure imperii) 
enjoy privilege to be immune from foreign jurisdictions. Belgian courts were among 
the very irsts to adopt the private acts as exceptions under the general principle in 
early 1857.49 In modern era, restrictive immunity has been adopted by the common 
law countries through their domestic legislations, however, some states still apply 
the absolute approach of immunity.
Considering that the restrictive approach of immunity doctrine has no universal 
application, this study found that choice of law provisions may be efective solutions 
to the immunity bridge problem. To avoid unfair treatment, parties in international 
commercial agreements are obliged to choose the law that promotes their favorable 
and fair business relationships. he chosen governing law will determine the 
validity and enforceability of the contract. his study recommends that the Law of 
New York and the English Law could ofer suitable governing laws for contractual 
agreements involving state parties. he two laws are worthy governing law because 
of the modern and sophisticated systems they created, guaranteeing predictability, 
providing certainty, and because both systems apply and support the restrictive 
immunity theory. 
he modern and sophisticated laws of England and the State of New York are core 
foundation of the common law systems. hese systems rely on two primary sources 
of law: codiied law (including constitutional law, statutory law, and regulatory 
law) and case law (precedents). Even if the codiied law is unclear Courts enjoy an 
utmost freedom for interpretation. Court decisions are of legal signiicance: they 
serve bases for future decisions of the courts if the cases before them arise from the 
same material facts. hese systems are universally known as the ones built on the 
doctrine of precedents forming the cornerstones of common law systems.50 
In fact, the precedent system contributes majorly in modernizing the law. Both 
statutory law and case law are completing each other. hey are more adaptable and 
responsive to complex and even complicated legal disputes than civil law systems. In 
certain areas, English and New York Law may show diferences, for instance in the 
49  Alabeek, Rosanne Van: he Immunity of States and heir Oicials in International Criminal 
and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2008) 14.
50  Harris, Bruce: Final Appellate Courts Overruling heir Own “Wrong” Precedents: 
he Ongoing Search for Principle, Law Quarterly Review, 118 (2002) 412-413.
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adoption of the good faith doctrine. New York Law conirms that ‘every contract 
imposes obligation of good faith in its performance’,51 while in contrast, English 
Law clearly deny the adoption of the good faith principle in its contract law.52 With 
strong emphasis on precedents, such diferences motivate the court to establish 
certain measures and legal reasoning53 rather than adverse legal constraints. 
Consistency of binding precedents in the common law legal systems provides 
predictability. For experienced parties, the laws that assure predictability it their 
basic needs. During the negotiation stage, parties can predict that the existing 
codiied rules and case law suiciently provide guidance for their future performance. 
Moreover, the contract would be more eicient if the chosen governing law paired 
with the forum selection clause point to the same jurisdiction and legal system. 
Choosing the English Law as governing law and the courts of England and Wales as 
intended dispute settlement forums in the agreement will prevent parties from the 
problem of competition between the lex fori on the enforceability and interpretation 
of the forum selection clause in the chosen law.54 
As we previously discussed, both English law and New York law grant immunity to 
the states but not in commercial activities. hese restrictive immunity concepts are 
also recognized as binding precedents. he US FSIA legislates that the immunity 
of a foreign state is not extended to suits based on its commercial acts.55 he United 
Kingdom’s State Immunity Act provides general regulation of immunity and lists 
certain exceptions of immunity to promote the doctrine of restrictive immunity.56 
Practicing lawyers recommend that it is important to waive the immunity clause in a 
contract. his clause indicates a consent of the state unconditionally and irrevocably 
that it would not invoke immunity as a sovereign entity. However, not all parties in 
51 Article 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
52  Cartwright, John: Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil 
Lawyer, Oxford, Hart Publishing (2007) 60.
53  English law has characteristically committed itself to no such overriding principle but has 
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. See 
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. (1989) 1 Q.B. 433. First 
Energy (UK) Ltd. v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd. (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194. Scottish 
Power Plc. v. Kvaerner Construction (Regions) Ltd. (1999) SLT 721.
54  Clermont, Kevin M.: Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, Hastings Law 
Journal, 66 (2015) 3, 652.
55  Article 1602 of he United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 15 ILM 1388 (1976) 
(hereinater: US FSIA)
56 Article 3 of he State Immunity Act, 17 ILM 1123 (1978)
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international commercial transactions are aware of this clause and option. In this 
matter, private parties must build strong arguments against the state parties that 
claim for immunity in their commercial activities. Using the immunity defense, 
state parties are sometimes reluctant to abide by their agreements to arbitrate the 
dispute.57
Waiver of the immunity could be implicit as in a form of an arbitration clause or 
agreement. his means that submission to arbitration is, in fact, implied consent to 
waive state immunity. It depends, however, that under certain circumstances that 
waiver of immunity is not explicit and suicient enough.58 Choice of law clause 
also plays an important role to restrict immunity. Choosing the law of the country 
that interprets immunity restrictively is also considered a waiver of immunity by 
implication.59 his legal concept has been recognized as a common rule under the 
common law systems, for example under section 1605 (a) (1) of the US FSIA stating 
that ‘a party’s agreement to arbitrate in the United States is considered consent to 
enforcement of that agreement and, therefore, a waiver of immunity in enforcement 
actions’.60 Moreover, section 456 of the US Restatement stated that: “under the 
law of the United States, an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction in: an action or other proceeding to compel arbitration pursuant to 
the agreement and an action to enforce an arbitral award rendered pursuant to the 
agreement.” 61
57  Domke, Martin: he Enforcement of Maritime Arbitration Agreements With Foreign 
Governments, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 2 (1971) 3, 618.
58  Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB (Sweden) v. Government of the Republic of Lithuania & 
AB Geonata (Lithuania). EWCA Civ 1529 (2006).
59  he FSIA legislative history outlined that “with respect to implicit waivers, the courts have 
found such waivers in cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another 
country or where a foreign state has agreed that the law of particular country should govern 
a contract.” Born: International Civil Litigation in US Courts: Commentary and Materials, 
he Netherlands, Kluwer Law international (1996) 227.
60 Article 1605 (a) (1) of US FSIA
61  Article 456 (2) (b) of Restatement (hird) Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
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Conclusions
Liability is an evergreen topic in international business law for businesses, legislators 
and courts. New trends in the 21st century certainly moved toward a risk allocation 
concept not emphasizing the liability part in case of contractual breach situations. 
As international norms lack universality and comprehensiveness to cover most 
transactions in the international market, business actors lean toward national laws 
or concepts that support their business interests the most. Other than the obvious 
choice of law and forum selection clauses, a new trend emerges in the world of 
international business law: existing contract law theories and treaties, conventions 
designed to regulate a diferent situation became popular as parties incorporate the 
terms of these ‘model laws’ into their agreements. A motivator in this trend is the 
certainty of such rules and the vast case law basis to interpret and support them. 
Also, contracting parties tend to merge civil law and contract law elements to create 
a world that leaves no gaps to ill for national laws, even if they picked a governing 
law for their future debates. While this hybrid solution seems to work in the B2B 
sector, the immunity principles are still present and cause nuisances to businesses 
that are willing to invest in a foreign country. Even the restrictive approach is 
burdened in some aspects as enforcement of awards against state entities and even 
against state owned companies lack universal standards, and most frequently, it is 
up to the current political and diplomatic atmosphere between the states.
